The Case for
Supporting Assad - Daniel Pipes - National
Review Online
Analysts agree that “the erosion of
the Syrian regime’s capabilities is accelerating,” that it continues to retreat step-by-step,
making a rebel breakthrough and an Islamist victory increasingly likely. In
response, I am changing my policy recommendation from neutrality to something that causes me, as a
humanitarian and decades-long foe of the Assad dynasty, to pause before
writing: Western governments should support the malign dictatorship of Bashar
Assad.
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Here is my logic for
this reluctant suggestion: Evil forces pose less danger to us when they make
war on each other. This (1) keeps them focused locally and (2) prevents either
one from emerging victorious (and thereby posing a yet-greater danger). Western
powers should guide enemies to stalemate by helping whichever side is losing,
so as to prolong the conflict.
This policy has
precedent. Through most of World War II, Nazi Germany was on the offensive
against Soviet Russia, and keeping German troops tied down on the Eastern Front
was critical to an Allied victory. Franklin D. Roosevelt therefore helped
Joseph Stalin by provisioning his forces and coordinating the war effort with
him. This morally repugnant but strategically necessary policy succeeded. And
Stalin was a far worse monster than is Assad.
The Iraq–Iran War of
1980–88 created a similar situation. After mid 1982, when Ayatollah Khomeini’s
forces went on the offense against those of Saddam Hussein, Western governments
began supporting Iraq. Yes, the Iraqi regime had started the hostilities and
was more brutal, but the Iranian one was ideologically more dangerous and on
the offensive.
The best-case
scenario is when the hostilities hobble both sides and prevent either one from
merging victorious. In the apocryphal words of Henry Kissinger, “It’s a pity
they both can’t lose.” In this spirit, I argued for U.S. help to the losing
party, whichever that might be, as in this May 1987 analysis: “In 1980, when
Iraq threatened Iran, our interests lay at least partly with Iran. But Iraq has
been on the defensive since the summer of 1982, and Washington now belongs
firmly on its side. . . . Looking to the future, should Iraq once again take
the offensive, an unlikely but not impossible change, the United States should
switch again and consider giving assistance to Iran.”
Applying this same
logic to Syria today finds notable parallels. Assad fills the role of Saddam
Hussein — the brutal Baathist dictator who began the violence. The rebel forces
resemble Iran — the initial victim getting stronger over time and posing an increasing Islamist danger.
In both cases continued fighting endangers the neighborhood and both sides
engage in war crimes and pose a danger to Western
interests.
Yes, Assad’s survival
benefits Tehran, the region’s most dangerous regime. But a rebel victory would
hugely boost the increasingly rogue Turkish government
while empowering jihadis and replacing the Assad government with triumphant,
inflamed Islamists. Continued fighting does less damage to Western interests
than letting the Islamists take power. There are worse prospects than Sunni and Shiite Islamists
mixing it up and Hamas jihadis killing Hezbollah jihadis,
and vice-versa. Better that neither side wins.
The Obama
administration is attempting an overly ambitious and subtle policy of
simultaneously helping the good rebels with clandestine lethal arms and
$114 million in aid even as
it prepares for possible drone strikes on
the bad rebels. Nice idea, but manipulating the rebel forces via remote control
has little chance of success. Inevitably, aid will end up with the Islamists
and air strikes will kill allies. Better to accept one’s limitations and aspire
to the feasible: propping up the side in retreat.
At the same time,
Westerners must be true to their morals and help bring an end to the warfare
against civilians, the millions of innocents gratuitously suffering the horrors
of civil war. Western governments should find mechanisms to compel the hostile
parties to abide by the rules of war, specifically those that isolate
combatants from non-combatants. This could entail pressuring the rebels’
suppliers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) and the Syrian government’s supporters
(Russia, China) to condition aid on abiding by the rules of war; it could even
involve Western use of force against violators on either side. That would
fulfill the responsibility to protect.
On the happy day when
Assad and Tehran have fought the rebels and Ankara to mutual exhaustion,
Western support then can go to non-Baathist and non-Islamist elements in Syria,
helping them offer a moderate alternative to today’s wretched choices and lead to
a better future.
— Daniel Pipes is
president of the Middle East Forum. © 2013 by Daniel Pipes. All rights
reserved.
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