The Coalition: President Obama’s attempt to form another “coalition of the willing” is foundering on the inherent contradictions of the mission he is undertaking, say a number of US officials privately. European partners have limited their participation to battlegrounds in Iraq, while Arab partners have limited theirs to Syria. For the Arabs, all conservative Sunni sheikhdoms and kingdoms, their goal is the overthrow of Shiite Iran’s partner, Bashar al-Assad in Syria. They have little stake in seeing (what is in their view) the salvation of Iran’s Shiite partners in Baghdad.
The Europeans, on the other hand, while detesting Assad’s regime and accepting in principle that international law allows for military action against Syria, cannot see a clear American strategy for a successful end game in Syria. As one European diplomat put it recently, “At least in Iraq we are trying to create an inclusive government which strengthens the Sunnis, who, after all, are the key to the success of ISIS.” [The British, as always, are more sympathetic to aiding the US across-the-board. Prime Minister Cameron, however, was told in no uncertain terms that the Labor Party would not support a resolution that permitted Britain to engage in military operations outside of Iraq. This allowed the British Prime Minister to garner an overwhelming 524-43 vote in favor of British participation – a far cry from his failure to fashion a majority in favor of air strikes against Syria in the wake of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons last spring].
IRAQ: But even in Iraq, the odds do not favor success and, in the view of a number of US analysts, suggest, at best, stalemate. Although General John Allen is highly respected for his mobilization of Sunni allies against Al-Qaeda during the surge, as well as his no-nonsense approach to decision making, it will, according to observers be a formidable undertaking to bring together a ground force comprised of so many disparate elements. The Kurds, who, at first reeled in face of the ISIS onslaught, are anything but willing partners with a Shiite led government in Baghdad [Although one analyst argued this week that Kurdish dreams of independence received a harsh dose of reality when it took US airpower aiding an Iraqigovernment to keep ISIS from entering the Kurdish enclave].
Sunni leaders, while now no longer having to deal with the hated Nouri al-Maliki, will take a lot of convincing before they see his successor, Haider al-Abadi as anything but “not Maliki”. As if to prove the point, Abadi has yet to fill the two most sensitive posts in his government, Ministers of Interior and Defense. These ministries, under Maliki, systematically excluded and in some case persecuted Sunni leaders. According to informed sources, Abadi is on the verge of naming a Sunni to head one of these ministries [But according to another source, was prevented from naming Sunnis to either post due to pressure from Teheran]. Another problem, according analysts, is just what kind of “National Guard” Baghdad has in mind. The creation of this new military component has been advertised as allowing the Sunnis to be organized and supported by Baghdad in an effort protect those areas of the country where they predominate. Yet, according to one well-informed source, it has yet to be decided whether the National Guard will be allowed to operate as more than a local constabulary.
SYRIA. As noted above, if these problems seem formidable, they pale in comparison to the challenges faced in Syria. To begin with, there is no credible force to face ISIS and other Sunni Jihadist groups other than the Assad government. In fact, it has been long argued within the Administration, that such a situation is precisely why the US should not get involved in Syria’s civil war. However, with ISIS’s sweeping initial victories, it became clear to the Administration that it was worth the risk of indirectly aiding the Assad regime by going after the bases and major resources of its most formidable adversaries. The Gulf States and Jordan made a similar calculation. Not only are they participating in the air attacks against ISIS but, much to the surprise of a number of veteran analysts, are doing so without any hesitation of “going public” about it. “Weren’t you shocked that the Jordanians, who have gone to great lengths to keep under wraps their participation in the training of anti-Assad rebels, would announce its role in the air war?” asked one analyst somewhat rhetorically.
ISIS & US: “This “coming out of the closet” as one State Department official put it this week, is one of a number benefits ISIS’s sweep into Iraq has engendered, according to a number of analysts. Perhaps the most important outcome, say a number of veteran analysts, is the reemergence of US military power in the region – and with it – increased respect for the Obama Administration among friends in the region. “It’s the silver lining” is the way one analyst put it. Another said ISIS brutality and stunning military successes have “finally shaken the tree” at the White House. State Department officials in particular have long argued for a more forceful response to the horrid civil war in Syria, only to be sidelined by White House opposition. While refusing to gloat [Repeatedly, State Department officials when asked whether the rise of ISIS could have been prevented by a bolder US policy in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, one urged by then Secretary Clinton among others at a senior level in the Administration, have refused to, as one put it this week, “…look back at ‘what ifs’.”], clearly State Department officials feel energized by the White House’s new found embrace of their expertise.
Turkey & Qatar: Still, as European reluctance to join the US in engaging ISIS in Syria has shown, the problem presented there daunts even the most optimistic US official. Even among those Arabs governments that are participating in military operations, there are a variety of aims. For example Qatar, which was under heavy pressure to join the coalition, still looks to the future enhancement of the Moslem Brotherhood [MB], which is anathema, particularly to the Saudis and the UAE. Then, there is the question of the role of Turkey, another MB supporter. Until they traded ISIS captives for their 40+ diplomats held by the Jihadists, Turkey refused to join the “coalition.” Now, under their somewhat mercurial President, Recep Erdogan, the Turks are “coming on board” as one Administration official put it this week. “But with the Turks you can never tell how much cooperation you can expect,” he adds. At the very least, US officials expect Turkey to staunch the flow of fighters (nearly all jihadists) entering Syria from along its 500 mile border. The US military would also like to be able to operate from its base at Incirlik, making air operations over Syria much less difficult. “With or without Incirlik, this is going to be one long row to hoe,” said a key US official this week.
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