Henry Kissinger on the Assembly of a New World
Order
The concept that has
underpinned the modern geopolitical era is in crisis
Henry Kissinger
Updated Aug. 29, 2014
The concept of order
that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis, writes Henry Kissinger.
Libya is in civil war,
fundamentalist armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and
Iraq and Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these
troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a relationship with
China divided between pledges of cooperation and public recrimination. The
concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis.
The search for world
order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of Western societies.
In the decades following World War II, the U.S.—strengthened in its economy and
national confidence—began to take up the torch of international leadership and
added a new dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and
representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of
liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just
and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed
peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects of their
clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a concert of
enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered people inherently
reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread
of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international order. Free
markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and substitute economic
interdependence for traditional international rivalries.
This effort to
establish world order has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora of
independent sovereign states govern most of the world's territory. The spread
of democracy and participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not
a universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate in
real time.
The years from perhaps
1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history when one
could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an amalgam of
American idealism and traditional European concepts of statehood and balance of
power. But vast regions of the world have never shared and only acquiesced in
the Western concept of order. These reservations are now becoming explicit, for
example, in the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea. The order established
and proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of
the state itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has been subjected
to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to transcend the state and
craft a foreign policy based primarily on the principles of soft power. But it
is doubtful that claims to legitimacy separated from a concept of strategy can
sustain a world order. And Europe has not yet given itself attributes of
statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power
along its borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved
into sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each other; religious
militias and the powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at will,
producing the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their own territory.
The challenge in Asia
is the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated to
an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the edge of
confrontation.
The clash between the
international economy and the political institutions that ostensibly govern it
also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary for world order. The
economic system has become global, while the political structure of the world
remains based on the nation-state. Economic globalization, in its essence,
ignores national frontiers. Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to
reconcile conflicting national aims or ideals of world order.
This dynamic has
produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by periodic financial
crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin America in the 1980s; in
Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in 2001 and again starting in
2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have few reservations about the system.
But the losers—such as those stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the
case with the European Union's southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions
that negate, or at least obstruct, the functioning of the global economic
system.
The international
order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent on the success of
globalization, but the process produces a political reaction that often works
counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the
current world order, such as it exists, is the absence of an effective
mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most
consequential issues. This may seem an odd criticism in light of the many
multilateral forums that exist—more by far than at any other time in history.
Yet the nature and frequency of these meetings work against the elaboration of
long-range strategy. This process permits little beyond, at best, a discussion
of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of summitry as
"social media" event. A contemporary structure of international rules
and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot merely be affirmed by joint
declarations; it must be fostered as a matter of common conviction.
The penalty for
failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in some regions
this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of influence identified
with particular domestic structures and forms of governance. At its edges, each
sphere would be tempted to test its strength against other entities deemed
illegitimate. A struggle between regions could be even more debilitating than
the struggle between nations has been.
The contemporary quest
for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of
orderwithin the various regions and to relate these regional orders
to one another. These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph
of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage
for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one country
militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis
for the rest of the world.
A world order of
states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and
cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our
hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be
sustained through a series of intermediary stages.
To play a responsible
role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared
to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no
matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even
if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek
to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What
should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral
group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance?
And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?
For the U.S., this
will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory levels. The celebration of
universal principles needs to be paired with recognition of the reality of
other regions' histories, cultures and views of their security. Even as the
lessons of challenging decades are examined, the affirmation of America's
exceptional nature must be sustained. History offers no respite to countries
that set aside their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous
course. But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the
absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
— Dr. Kissinger served
as national security adviser and secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and
Ford. Adapted from his book "World Order," to be published Sept.
9 by the Penguin Press.
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