Iran Nuclear Deal:

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Iran Nuclear Deal:      Events are moving quickly as representatives of the P5+ 1 (US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) engage at the end of this week in crucial talks with Iran.  At stake is not only what not only top US Administration officials, but also Iranian representatives, call the best chance in years for an initial agreement on the course of Iran’s nuclear development program.  The focus is directly on an interim deal that would, in the view of the P-5+ 1, freeze or at least slow down Iran’s dash towards nuclear weapons capability – in exchange for short term easing of international economic sanctions on Teheran.  However, the stakes are much greater than whether this round of talks is a success.

The French:         When they met last month, by all accounts, Secretary of State Kerry was close to inking a deal with his Iranian counterpart Mohammed Zarif.  However, at the last minute the deal fell through, with most observers blaming the French for scuttling the accord.  According to well-informed US sources, the French, were indeed, miffed at being sidelined and argued that some of the provisions were not adequately addressed [Notably the question of how stringent would be the restrictions on activities at the Iranian nuclear plant at Arak that has the potential to provide yet another avenue for developing a nuclear bomb].  It is also clear that, among the P-5+1, the French, in particular, thought the Americans were in too much of a hurry to conclude a deal.  But, still both European and American sources insist that communications was the major problem, notably what the top officials, Kerry and his counterparts, had heard from the “technical” advisors who had been negotiating with the Iranians previously.  Most important, after a lengthy phone conversation between President Obama and French President Hollande, both sides say, to quote one well-informed observer, “ We are now on the same page.”

Israel:        Yet, even as this tortuous diplomacy played out, there were other actors clamoring to be heard.  Most outspoken was Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.  He denounced the deal even before it collapsed.  And his language was both blunt and uncompromising.  The Israeli position clearly diverges from the P5+1 in its most important aspect – the demand by Jerusalem that Iran’s nuclear program be dismantled, not halted or even set back.  They believe that nothing less than that will prevent Iran, given its more than two decade effort to developing its nuclear program, from becoming a nuclear armed state in very quick order.  This so-called “break-out” capability, say the Israelis, could be as close as six weeks away.  As such, it constitutes an existential threat to the State.  Therefore, any deal that does not lead to the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capability merely increases the likelihood of armed conflict, initiated by Israel.

US Congress.     Another party also demanding to be heard is the US Congress.  For some time now, an overwhelming bi-partisan majority of both the House and Senate has gone on record and more importantly passed legislation that has increased economic pressure on Iran.  Each time Congress has acted, it has been opposed by the Administration in power, Republican as well as Democratic.  And again, this week, with Congress poised to broaden sanctions, the Administration argued vigorously that they would be counterproductive.  However, as one Administration insider said privately this week, “We are in danger of becoming the `little boy who cried wolf’” – a reference to repeated pleas against tougher sanctions which not only were ignored by Congress but ultimately benefited the Administration’s negotiating position.  Still, the intense lobbying by Administration officials from the President on down, has – for a time – succeeded in gaining a respite – at least until the beginning of December.

Saudi Arabia.     Perhaps those with the most at stake, the Gulf countries, while not as outspoken in public, have made it clear privately to US officials, their unhappiness with the prospect of a deal with Iran.  However, unlike Congress, which has a mainly political stake in the outcome or Israel, which possesses a military that can theoretically act on its own, the Gulf States have nowhere else to turn, other than to the US for protection from an aggressive Iran, particularly one that is a proverbial “screw driver away” from assembling a nuclear weapon.  Moreover, the Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, have complaints about US Middle East policy that go beyond Iran’s nuclear intentions.  These days it focuses on Syria -- where the last minute deal brokered by Russia that prevented an American military strike on Syria – left the top leadership in Riyadh incensed.  So much so, that quite uncharacteristically, the Saudis have “gone public” with their disenchantment. Led by Prince Bandar, the Kingdom’s key player on Syria, the Saudis have let it be known that they believe the strategic nature of the longstanding US-Saudi relationship is under review.  While American officials scoff at the notion that the Saudis have any alternative, it has not prevented them, Bandar in particular, from trying to chart an independent course, where possible. It has also led, at least in one instance to a very un-Saudi like snub.  On his last trip to Riyadh, according to informed sources, Kerry’s scheduled meeting with Bandar was abruptly cancelled at the very last moment. [Although this action, like many of Bandar’s recent actions and those of his generation of Princes, is being seen by US analysts as indicative of the infighting now going on as the last of the sons of Abdul Aziz – the Kingdom’s Founder – fade from the scene].

Russia.       As those aggrieved with US policy have maneuvered for leverage, recently all have turned to Russia.  Over the past few months, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even Israel [Netanyahu visited Moscow last weekend lobbying Vladimir Putin on the Iranian threat], have struck up talks with the onetime Super Power.  Referring to this unlikely trio working the Russians, one US State Department official sighed, “What an extreme example of the enemy of my enemy is, well, not exactly but close to being my friend’.”  This official went on to say that there is a real shared interest among this three some which goes beyond Iran and directly to the heart of US policymaking.  The Israelis as well as the Saudis believe that the Obama Administration has badly mishandled the consequences of the “Arab Spring”, particularly in its handling of the rise of the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt.  The Israelis fear their (MB) profound hostility to the Jewish state.  The Saudis see them as fascists.  And the Egyptian military see them as direct threat to their primacy at home.  For those reasons, US analysts expect Saudi money to keep pouring into Egypt; Israeli military ‘spare parts’ finding their way to the Egyptian military, should the US cut them off, and the Egyptian military itself willing to go to any lengths necessary to prevent its (MB) reemergence or even large demonstrations on its behalf.

Oh, Brother! Big Brother Is Back By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

November 23, 2013

Oh, Brother! Big Brother Is Back

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — I’VE never been in a big earthquake, but I know what one feels like now, having spent this past week in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The American-led interim negotiations in Geneva to modestly loosen some sanctions on Iran in return for some curbs on its nuclear program — in advance of talks for an end to sanctions in return for an end to any Iranian bomb-making capability — has hit the Sunni Arab world (and Israel) like a geopolitical earthquake. If and when a deal is struck, it could have a bigger impact on this region than anything since the Camp David peace treaty and Iran’s Islamic Revolution in the 1970s combined to reorder the Middle East.

Why? When Iran had its Islamic Revolution in 1979, it was, emotionally speaking, like a big brother who walked out, slamming the door behind him. Everyone in the family got used to his being gone. Somebody took his bedroom; somebody else took his bicycle; and everyone enjoyed the undiluted attention and affection of Uncle Sam — for 34 years. Now, just the thought of big brother, Iran, being reintegrated and having its own direct relationship with the United States has set all of America’s Sunni Arab allies — Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan — on edge, especially at a time when Iran is malignly meddling in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain.

The signs of that nervousness range from the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut last week that killed 23 people to a recent essay in Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper by one of the Arab Gulf’s leading journalists, Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, who wrote: “From a theoretical, political and military perspective, Saudi Arabia will have to protect itself from the Iranian regime’s nuclear program, either with a nuclear weapon or via agreements that will maintain the regional balance of power and protect Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.” Yikes.

There are so many layers to this: Iran is big — 85 million people; Saudi Arabia is small — 20 million people. Saudi Arabia has the largest oil and gas reserves in the Middle East — and Iran is right behind. If sanctions are fully eased one day, will Iran take market share away from Gulf Arabs? The Arab Gulf is primarily Sunni; Iran is Shiite. The Iranians are developing indigenous nuclear technology; the Sunni Arabs have none.

The Geneva talks are exposing the different interests that America and its regional allies have vis-à-vis Iran, which the sanctions regime had been masking. All the years of sanctions allowed diverse parties with diverse interests — the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf Arabs, Europe, Russia and China — to “pretend to be having the same discussion about Iran strategy, while disagreeing about the ultimate goal of negotiations and the role that sanctions could play in getting us there or not,” notes Daniel Brumberg, a Georgetown University professor and Middle East expert.

If the United States is to maintain its relationships out here, and ensure that the Iran nuclear agreement doesn’t fuel more instability, the interim and final deals have to be good ones. Sanctions should only be finally removed if we can impose on Iran a rollback of its enriched fuels and enrichment technologies, along with sufficient intrusive inspections, to make an undetectable Iranian breakout to a nuclear bomb impossible.

But even if the Iranians agree to such a deal, it will be a hard sell to our allies. American officials believe that, ultimately, the only way to defuse an Iranian threat to the region is both to defuse its nuclear program and change the character of the regime, and that the two are related. Unlike our allies here in the Gulf, we believe that there is real politics inside Iran and differences within the leadership and between the leadership and the people. But those differences have been largely choked off — and the hard-liners given a monopoly on power — as a result of Iran’s isolation from the world. If we can get an airtight nuclear deal that also opens the way for Iran’s reintegration into the global economy, American officials hope that different interest groups — including more stakeholders in engagement with the U.S. and the West — will be empowered inside Iran and start to change the character of the regime.

It may not work, but it’s a worthy bet because the only real security for Iran’s neighbors can come from an evolutionary change in the character of that regime. So, if Iran’s nuclear capabilities are curbed, we can live with that bet on evolutionary change — especially since it would likely facilitate an end to the U.S.-Iran cold war, which has hampered our cooperating on regional issues. Our allies, by contrast, do not trust Iran at all and therefore don’t believe in evolutionary change there. They want Iran stripped of all nuclear technology until there is regime change.

We can’t close that gap. We can only manage it by being very clear about our goals: to unleash politics inside Iran as much as possible, while leashing its nuclear program as tightly as possible, while continuing to protect our Arab and Israeli allies. That’s why, in addition to Secretary of State John Kerry, we may also need a “Secretary of State Just for the Middle East.” Because restoring the U.S.-Iran relationship and bringing it in from the cold after 34 years is such a wrenching shock to the Middle East system, it will require daily consultation and hand-holding with all our Arab and Israeli friends.

MIDDLE EAST NEWS Beirut Attack Marks Militant Resurgence/By MARIA ABI-HABIB

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MIDDLE EAST NEWS

Beirut Attack Marks Militant Resurgence

Embassy Bombing Points to Rise of al Qaeda-Inspired Extremists, Enabled by a Weak Government and Civil War in Syria

By 

MARIA ABI-HABIB

Updated Nov. 21, 2013 2:40 a.m. ET

Twin attacks against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut signal the rising strength of al Qaeda-inspired groups in Lebanon, in another toxic byproduct of the Syrian war. Maria Habib and "NOW Lebanon" columnist Michael Weiss discuss on the News Hub. (Photo: AP)

BEIRUT—As new details emerged about twin suicide bombings near the Iranian Embassy here, Lebanese officials described an outburst of violence that reveals the resurgence of al Qaeda-inspired groups in their country, a toxic byproduct of the Syrian war.

The attack on Tuesday killed 25 people and wounded 147, but was blocked from reaching its target. The second suicide bomber was prevented from ramming his explosives into the Iranian embassy after a water truck was abandoned at the embassy's gate by frightened bystanders who fled their vehicle after the first bomber, who approached on a motorcycle, detonated his explosives, security officials said on Wednesday.

Behind the attack is a recent shift by radicalized Lebanese Sunnis to join the region's jihadist movement—for years dominated by other Arab nationals—as splits within the Lebanese government leave a vacuum in which they can pursue their violent activities.

Small groups like the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which claimed responsibility for Tuesday's attack, are growing in strength, bolstered by millions of dollars from private Saudi donors, Lebanese and U.S. officials said. The funds go to Sunni Islamist militants seeking to help overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and strike at his Shiite allies, Iran and Hezbollah.

Some Lebanese leaders have turned a blind eye to the rise of such groups, worried that by confronting them, their support base would erode, Western officials said.

The violence, the first bomb attack on an embassy in Lebanon since the U.S. Embassy bombing in 1983, deepened fears of intensified violence spilling over from the war in Syria.

The al Qaeda-like bombings that hit the Iranian embassy in Lebanon Tuesday have deepened fears that the regional proxy war over Syria is now playing out in a deadly new way in Lebanon. Via The Foreign Bureau, WSJ's global news update. (Photo: AP)

Admiral Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence, talks to the WSJ's Sara Murray about the risk of an Al Qaeda comeback in Syria.

"We have entered a totally new phase, security-wise. The Syrian war is now here," said Nohad Machnouk, a member of parliament with the anti-Hezbollah Future Movement. "It will be more bloodshed…until there is a way forward in Syria."

The Abdullah Azzam Brigades described the attack as revenge for Iran and Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime. The group is known to operate in Lebanon but has never staged such a devastating attack.

On Wednesday, Hezbollah held military-style funerals for some of the victims, with yellow party flags draped over caskets.

The radicalization of Sunnis in Lebanon is most acute in the north, where an open war is being fought around Tripoli, the country's second-largest city.

Residents of Tripoli's suburbs suffer from poverty and illiteracy, and are openly hostile to a government they say does nothing to help them. Al Qaeda groups there have waged monthslong battles with Alawites, the offshoot of Shiite Islam to which the Syrian president belongs. Radical groups even ambushed the Lebanese security forces last month.

Women in a Hezbollah stronghold of Beirut toss flowers over a funeral procession on Wednesday for victims of the attack on the Iranian Embassy.Associated Press

Concern about radical Lebanese leaders stepped up this year after al Qaeda's core leadership in Pakistan and Yemen sanctioned affiliates in northern Lebanon, according to intercepted communications between the parties, American and Lebanese officials said.

Rivalries between moderates of Lebanon's Sunni political class have allowed Lebanon's Sunni radicals to flourish over the last year. The clout of these politicians has waned in recent years, limiting their ability and will to support a crackdown on extremist groups, U.S. and Lebanese officials said.

In Tripoli's suburbs, men drink tea and play backgammon underneath black al Qaeda flags. Armed men who pledge allegiance to religious leaders patrol the streets in black jeeps with tinted windows and no license plates. Pop-up mosques have been created to collect arms and funding for rebels fighting in Syria or operations in Lebanon, changing locations weekly, from garages to abandoned buildings.

"We're fighting a war that's now out in the open up north," said an American official about growing extremism in Tripoli.

The religious leader of the group that claimed responsibility for Tuesday's attack, Lebanese Sunni Sheikh Sirajeddine Zuraiqat, is one of many radicals in Lebanon who have used political connections to keep their activities from being curbed.

Mr. Zuraiqat, thought to be in his mid-20s, only recently turned to radical religious ideology, said an acquaintance.

He used to run a cellphone shop in a central Beirut neighborhood.

This year, Mr. Zuraiqat was detained by Lebanese army intelligence agents on suspicion of ties to terrorism, said an official who works in the office of the Grand Mufti, the country's leading Sunni religious authority.

Mr. Zuraiqat's parents came to the mufti and asked for him to intercede on their son's behalf, said a person familiar with the negotiations. Soon after, Mr. Zuraiqat was released.

A spokesman for the mufti's office said authorities haven't proved their allegations against Mr. Zuraiqat. He added that the mufti would support the sheik's imprisonment if he was responsible for Tuesday's bombings.

A more prominent Sunni leader, Shadi Mawlawi, openly roams the streets of Tripoli's Qibbeh district, an area he said that the national army "wouldn't dare enter."

Mr. Mawlawi was arrested by Lebanese authorities last year, following a tip by American officials who suspected him of financing and arming al Qaeda-linked Syrian rebels.

The 27-year-old was charged with belonging to Jabhat al Nusra, an al Qaeda offshoot in Syria. He denied the charges. The U.S. Embassy declined to comment.

Mr. Mawlawi's arrest sparked deadly clashes in Tripoli that lasted 11 days, ending when he was released on a $333 bail—paid, he said, by Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

Mr. Mikati denied paying Mr. Mawlawi's bail. But upon his release, Mr. Mawlawi was driven in the luxury sedan of Lebanon's finance minister to Mr. Mikati's house in Tripoli, as fireworks were set off in his honor by supporters.

"I ate kanafi with Mikati, and it was delicious," Mr. Mawlawi said, referring to a famous Tripoli dessert.

Mr. Mikati acknowledged receiving Mr. Mawlawi, but said he showed up uninvited. "I didn't do myself, anything to release him…the judge took that decision," he said. "I didn't ask that he come to my home."

The case against Mr. Mawlawi was reopened this spring by Lebanon's Military Tribunal.

Mr. Mawlawi denied the charges of being a member of Jabhat al Nusra, an al Qaeda offshoot in Syria. But he boasted that, along with other prominent, government-supported sheiks, he has raised up to $1.5 million for Syrian jihadis and sent them "hundreds of arms" over the last two years.

"We are all victims in the north, Beirut does not care," he said, referring to the central government. "No one is addressing the plight of Sunni [Muslims].…Shadi Mawlawi is doing what all other players are doing in this game, to protect their own side."

—Nour Malas, Rima Abushakra and Mohammed Hamdar contributed to this article.

Write to Maria Abi-Habib at maria.habib@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications 
Tuesday's violence in Beirut was the first bomb attack on an embassy in Lebanon since the U.S. Embassy bombing in 1983. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said it was the first attack since 1983.

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Young Palestinian Refugees Join Jihadists Fighting in Syria/By MARIA ABI-HABIB

MIDDLE EAST NEWS

Young Palestinian Refugees Join Jihadists Fighting in Syria

In Lebanese Camps, Disaffected Hope War Against Assad Regime Will Give Them a Sense of Purpose

By 

MARIA ABI-HABIB

Nov. 20, 2013 7:23 p.m. ET

Palestinian Munir el Makdah is flanked by bodyguards as he stands in front of a hospital at the Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp last month. Dalia Khamissy for The Wall Street Journal

AIN EL-HILWEH REFUGEE CAMP—Inside Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp, disaffected and unemployed youth are increasingly joining radical Islamist groups fighting in Syria, saying it gives their lives a sense of purpose.

The growing hold of the jihadists is evident on the street at the camp's entrance, lined with flags of al Qaeda-linked groups that operate in Lebanon or Syria. Homes on Tawareq Street are pockmarked by bullets and rocket-propelled grenades—scars of recent fighting between Islamist militants and the Lebanese army.

The camp's ties to jihadist groups fighting in Syria came into sharp relief on Tuesday. The head of the group that claimed responsibility for the bombing that killed 25 people outside Iran's Embassy in Beirut lived in the camp for a time and the brigade operated openly there. The group linked the bombing to the conflict in Syria.

Related

·         Beirut Attack Marks Militant Resurgence

The youth of Ain el-Hilweh, Lebanon's most radicalized camp, have largely given up hope of a Palestinian state that they can return to someday. With unemployment at about 80% here, some say they are drawn to fight with Islamists trying to topple the Syrian regime.

With the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority weakened by corruption and mismanagement, a leadership vacuum in the camp is increasingly being filled by the Islamist militants.

Munir el Makdah, camp leader of the Fatah faction that represents the Palestinian Authority, said he is powerless to stop the better-funded extremist groups from luring youth here. Even his own 18-year-old son Hussein tried to sneak across the border to fight in Syria with four friends in August.

But they were caught by Hezbollah, the powerful Lebanese Shiite militant group that is allied with the Syrian regime and handed them over to the Lebanese army.

"In my day, it was about resisting Israel, none of this religious fight," said Mr. el Makdah. "Fatah has lost the majority of control over the camps because we can't provide anymore," he added.

"The new generation have to occupy themselves with something and they're going either into drugs or Islamic radicalism.…The Islamic groups are much more organized and have much more money."

Posters of fighters sporting handlebar mustaches, shaggy haircuts and aviator sunglasses, popular with mostly secular militants during Lebanon's civil war, have been replaced with images of men with long beards and white robes with Islamic texts in the backdrop.

They stand as a testament to the growing radicalization throughout the region, which the Syrian civil war has fueled.

"We are putting up the flags of al Qaeda ourselves," said Ahmed Abdullah, 18, who dropped out of school when he was nine and is jobless like the vast majority of Ain el-Hilweh's residents.

Mr. Abdullah sat in a carpentry shop on Tawareq Street with two friends who had both fought in Syria with Islamist groups. He said he wants to fight in Syria, but hasn't yet, worried that Lebanese forces or the Syrian regime will capture him crossing the border.

"I went with my brother," said Mahmoud, 21, a handyman. "We fought with Jabhat al Nusra," he said, referring to one of the strongest Islamist groups fighting in Syria.

"But there were so many of us and not enough weapons," he added. "All of us want to get to Syria to fight. They are Muslims there like us."

The ties between the Syrian war, Lebanon and the Palestinian camps came into clearer focus in the Iranian Embassy bombing.

The al Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility, demanding the withdrawal of Hezbollah and Shiite fighters from Syria.

The leader of the group, Saudi national Majed Bin-Mohammed al-Majed, lived in Ain el-Hilweh for a time, though Lebanese authorities believe he may be fighting in Syria now. He is on Saudi Arabia's most-wanted terrorist list for his alleged ties to al Qaeda.

The poverty and lawlessness in Lebanon's 12 Palestinian camps with some 450,000 refugees are providing extremists with the cover they need to bolster their ranks and recruit for Syria's war, a magnet for the region's jihadists.

Under a decades-old agreement, the Lebanese army is barred from patrolling the camps, making them prime spots for militants to shelter, Lebanese officials lament.

Flush with donations from citizens in the oil-rich Gulf, Lebanese officials say extremist groups here are aggressively bolstering their ranks by seizing on the Palestinian Authority's governance failures and a frustrated refugee population.

Lebanon is one of the few countries in the region that hasn't given its Palestinian refugees citizenship while barring them most employment.

"There is no future in the camps. We have God and UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Work Agency), and look at what they've done," Ahmed Moussa said spitefully, referring to the U.N. agency that aids Palestinian refugees.

Mr. Moussa said several friends and relatives had fought in Syria.

"From every street, there are five or six men who've fought."

Ain el-Hilweh was supposed to be a temporary settlement for some of the 700,000 Palestinians that fled or were forced out of their homes during the 1948 war surrounding the establishment of the state of Israel.

Instead the camp, whose name means 'sweet spring,' has become a reluctant home, tents giving way to houses stacked on top of each other over the decades.

The camp—Lebanon's largest—now houses some 80,000 refugees in an area not even a mile wide. It abuts the southern city of Sidon, Lebanon's third largest, which also suffers from poverty.

Tawareq, which means 'emergency' in Arabic, hosts militant groups such as Jund al Sham—one of the most powerful Islamist group in the camp and biggest recruiter of jihadists fighting in Syria. The street is absent of men during the day. Women say their husbands and sons won't venture out in the daytime, worried about snipers or assassination by their secular rivals in the Palestinian Authority.

Tensions between Fatah's mostly secular fighters and the mushrooming Islamist militants in the camp boiled over late last month in a spate of assassinations. Fatah fighters are trying to curb the influence of militants such as Jund al Sham, officials say.

In October, Fatah's Mussad Hujeir, in charge of camp security, was gunned down a few days after an assassination attempt on a Jund al Sham leader. A Western official said assassinations have accelerated, though many aren't disclosed publicly.

Palestinian leaders such as Mr. el Makdah worry that the rise of Islamist militants will bring a crushing response from the Lebanese state. Fresh on their minds is the battle between Fatah al Islam—another al Qaeda spinoff group—and the Lebanese security forces in 2007. Fatah al Islam attacked the army from Nahr al Bared Palestinian camp, just outside the northern city of Tripoli.

The three-month siege killed 168 soldiers, 52 civilians and 226 militants. The army had to raze the camp to defeat Fatah al Islam, making the Palestinians there refugees once again.

Let’s Make a Deal By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Let’s Make a Deal

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — The Middle East once again proves that if you eat right, exercise regularly and don’t smoke, you’ll live long enough to see everything, including a day when the Jews controlling Jerusalem and the Sunni Saudi Custodians of the Great Mosques of Mecca and Medina would form a tacit alliance against the Shiite Persians of Iran and the Protestants of America — with the Hindus of India and the Confucians of China also supporting America, sort of, while the secularist French play all sides.

I’ve now seen everything.

But is this good news? At one level, yes. I attended a Gulf security conference here in Abu Dhabi that included officials and experts from all over the Arab/Muslim world. In the opening session, Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, flanked by the white and blue Israeli flag, gave an address by satellite from his office in Jerusalem. Good for the United Arab Emirates, the conference sponsor, for making that happen. Seeing the Israeli president speak to an audience dotted with Arab headdresses reminded me of the Oslo days, when Israelis and Arabs held business conferences in Cairo and Amman.

But this tacit Israeli-Sunni Arab cooperation is not based on any sort of reconciliation, but on the tribal tradition that my enemy’s enemy is my friend — and the enemy is Iran, which has been steadily laying the groundwork to build a nuclear weapon. Diplomats and ministers from Israel and the Israel lobby have been working Congress, while officials from Arab Gulf states have been telling the Obama administration directly the same message: how much they oppose the proposed deal that Secretary of State John Kerry and the foreign ministers of France, Britain, Russia, China and Germany have drafted to trade limited sanctions relief in return for Iran starting to roll back its nuclear program.

Never have I seen Israel and America’s core Arab allies working more in concert to stymie a major foreign policy initiative of a sitting U.S. president, and never have I seen more lawmakers — Democrats and Republicans — more willing to take Israel’s side against their own president’s. I’m certain this comes less from any careful consideration of the facts and more from a growing tendency by many American lawmakers to do whatever the Israel lobby asks them to do in order to garner Jewish votes and campaign donations.

That said, I don’t mind Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu of Israel and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia going ballistic — in stereo — over this proposed deal. It gives Kerry more leverage. Kerry can tell the Iranians: “Look, our friends are craaaaaazzzy. And one of them has a big air force. You better sign quick.”

No, I don’t begrudge Israel and the Arabs their skepticism, but we still should not let them stop a deal. If you’re not skeptical about Iran, you’re not paying attention. Iran has lied and cheated its way to the precipice of building a bomb, and without tough economic sanctions — sanctions that President Obama engineered but which Netanyahu and the Arab states played a key role in driving — Iran would not be at the negotiating table. I also understand the specific concerns of the Gulf Arabs, which I’d summarize as: “It looks to us as if you want to do this deal and then get out of the region — and leave behind an Iran that will only become economically more powerful, at a time when it already has enormous malign influence in Syria, Iraq, in Lebanon through Hezbollah, and in Bahrain.”

I get it, but I also don’t think we’d just abandon them. In the long run, the deal Kerry is trying to forge with Iran is good for us and our allies for four reasons: 1) In return for very limited sanctions relief, the deal is expected to freeze all of Iran’s nuclear bomb-making technologies, roll back some of them and put in place an unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, while maintaining all the key oil sanctions so Iran will still be hurting aplenty. This way Iran can’t “build a bomb and talk” at the same time (the way Israel builds more settlements while it negotiates with Palestinians). Iran freezes and rolls back part of its program now, while we negotiate a full deal to lift sanctions in return for Iran agreeing to restrictions that make it impossible for it to break out with a nuclear weapon. 2) While, Netanyahu believes more sanctions will get Iran to surrender every piece of its nuclear technology, Iran experts say that is highly unlikely. 3) Iran has already mastered the technology to make a bomb (and polls show that this is very popular with Iranians). There is no way to completely eliminate every piece of Iran’s nuclear technology unless you wipe every brain clean there. 4) The only lasting security lies in an internal transformation in Iran, which can only come with more openness. Kerry’s deal would roll back Iran’s nuclear program, while also strengthening more moderate tendencies in Iran. Maybe that will go nowhere, or maybe it will lead to more internal changes. It’s worth a carefully constructed test.

If Israel kills this U.S.-led deal, then the only option is military. How many Americans or NATO allies will go for bombing Iran after Netanyahu has blocked the best effort to explore a credible diplomatic alternative? Not many. That means only Israel will have a military option. If Israel uses it, it may set Iran back, but it will also set Iran free to rush to a bomb. Is Israel ready to bomb Iran every six months?

"هل تحتاج سوريا الجديدة إلى "حياد إيجابي"؟

ميشال أبو نجم

"النهار" الخميس 14 تشرين الثاني 2013

ارتبطت فكرة "الحياد الإيجابي" بلبنان منذ تأسيسه بسبب انقسامه الداخلي وحدّة الصراع الإقليمي والدولي على موقعه الإستراتيجي، في مقابل استقرار دول المشرق بسبب سلطويتها. لكن التطاحن السعودي الإيراني والتجاذب الدولي الذي يجعل من الحرب السورية الأعنف في المشرق منذ انهيار الأمبراطورية العثمانية، يسمح بالتساؤل عن فكرة "الحياد الإيجابي" كحاجة سورية بل مشرقية.

العامل الأساس الذي عمّم "الخصائص اللبنانية" في التنوع المذهبي وأزماته وكيفية إدارته والذي يسمح بمناقشة فكرة الحياد الإيجابي هو سقوط السلطويات العسكرية القومية في العراق والأزمة التي تواجهها في سوريا حالياً. لطالما تغنّت هذه الأنظمة وتفاخرت بأنها بعيدة عن "الأمراض" اللبنانية في الإنقسام الطائفي والتفكك. وبالتالي تحولها ساحة لصراع القوى الدولية والإقليمية، فإذا بصدمة 11 أيلول ولاحقاً التغيرات العربية تدفع إلى السطح بكل ما قمعته هذه الأنظمة في المشرق بالحديد والنار والإيديولوجيا وتفجِّر التناقضات الإجتماعية في شكل أعنف بكثير مما حصل في الحالة اللبنانية.

تاريخياً، كانت سوريا الحالية ممراً للغزوات والفتوحات والتجاذب خاصة بين ثلاث دول- أمم في المنطقة هي مصر وتركيا وإيران، وفي حال تنافس قوي مع العصبيات والأنظمة التي حكمت العراق، إضافةً إلى القوى الغربية. وبعد استقلالها عاشت سوريا أكثر من عقدين في عدم استقرار ترجم كثافة في الإنقلابات العسكرية لم تتكرر في أي بلد عربي آخر. كان التسارع في الإنقلابات نتيجة لصراع الأحزاب السورية والجيش والشخصيات التقليدية ووجهاء المدن والحركات الدينية والتناقضات الإجتماعية، لكن أيضاً بسبب عنف الصراع بين المحاور الإقليمية المتصارعة، وخاصةً بين العراق والسعودية ومصر.
فالصراع بين المحور الهاشمي العراقي الأردني ومصر والسعودية أرخى بظلاله على انقلابات مطلع الخمسينات، ومنح الزخم القومي بقيادة جمال عبد الناصر والتجاذب مع حلف بغداد الأسباب الكافية لقيام الوحدة مع مصر ولالتصاق سوريا أكثر بالناصرية وابتعادها عن الممالك العربية المحافظة. وذلك قبل أن يحصل الإنفصال مدعوماً من السعودية والأردن ومن ثم تقع الوقيعة بين البعث الجديد وجمال عبد الناصر وينعكس ذلك تأثيراً على تياريهما في الجيش في أوائل الستينات ويُصفى الجناح الناصري بقيادة جاسم علوان من المؤسسة العسكرية والتأثير السياسي، بعد محاولة انقلاب فاشلة. وأعقب ذلك بدء التنافس العنيف والدموي بين التوأمين البعثيين في سوريا والعراق على خلفية الصراعات الحزبية القيادية.
اليوم ومع انهيار السلطوية، عادت سوريا لتصبح "ملعباً" للصراع كما كانت في أعوام الخمسينات والستينات قبل أن يُحكِم حافظ الأسد قبضته ويجعل من سوريا لاعباً أساسياً على مستوى المشرق والمعادلة العربية، بشهية للسيطرة على القرار الإستراتيجي في أطراف المشرق من الأردن ولبنان إلى المنظمات الفلسطينية. بنى الأسد الإستقرار السوري الداخلي ودور "اللاعب" بتوازن بين تكريس النظام السلطوي وجهاز القمع بمرونة أوسع مع النخب السنية البورجوازية خاصة الدمشقية، والإستفادة من المعادلات والحاجات الإقليمية والدولية من خلال لعبة "حافة الهاوية" التي سمحت له بهامش واسع من مناورة الحركة. فيتحالف مع الإتحاد السوفياتي لكنه يهيمن على لبنان بتغطية أميركية ويحجّم منظمة التحرير ويشارك في تحرير الكويت تحت العلم الأميركي، ويتحالف مع إيران مع الحفاظ على علاقاته مع السعودية ومصر اللتين بنى معهما في التسعينات أرضية لركيزة عربية مؤثرة، ويضرب "الإخوان المسلمين" بغض نظر من النظامين الأصوليين في السعودية وإيران، ويدعم قوى المقاومة ضد إسرائيل لكنه يشارك في مؤتمر مدريد ومفاوضات جنيف وشيبردتاون. ولا يتردد في استيعاب التحرك الأميركي الإسرائيلي في مواجهات الأردن عام 1970 والتخلي عن قرار دعم الفدائيين الذي كان احد الأسباب التي سرعّت أو استخدمت لتصفية الجناح البعثي اليساري المتشدد الذي كان يقوده غريمه آنذاك صلاح جديد.

في سوريا الحالية اكتمل مشهد النزاع العالمي على "عقدة المشرق"، وبات واضحاً للعيان أن آليات القمع الداخلي وعنف الحركات المعارضة للنظام لا تكفي وحدها لصنع كل هذا التفكك والدمار. فالمعادلة الحالية هي نتيجة قرار إيران وروسيا بالذهاب في الدفاع عن مصالحهما واعتباراتهما "الوجودية" في سوريا حتى النهاية، في مقابل الإصرار السعودي ومعها الخليج على تحطيم النفوذ الإيراني في المشرق. وفي حال استمرار المواجهة الحالية حتى ولو سقط النظام السوري، وقبل اتضاح صورة لتسويةٍ إقليمية ما أو المضي قدماً في الحرب، يصعب تخيل استقرار الوضع في سوريا مستقبلاً خاصةً مع بقاء نواة صلبة من الجيش البعثي وتركيبة سياسية وعسكرية علوية مواجِهة لأي نظام جديد لا يأخذ مصالحها في الإعتبار.

بغض النظر عن صورة التوازنات الإقليمية والدولية التي ستحدِّد موقع سوريا المستقبلية، ومدى التفكك الذي سيتحكم بواقعها الجغرافي والسياسي والإجتماعي، المؤكد أنها ستكون دولةَ ضعيفة تتناتشها المحاور والفوضى وتزدهر فيها "الأقاليم". من هنا فكرة التساؤل عن "حياد إيجابي" بين محوري الصراع الإقليمي المذهبي. المسألة لا تقتصر على سوريا بل تمتد إلى كامل المشرق الممزق من بغداد إلى بيروت، ولا تتعلق بصراع إقليمي استراتيجي فقط بل بالبنية الإجتماعية المذهبية المتنوعة التي تجعل من أي حدث في أي بقعة من المشرق يتردد صداه في كل الإقليم. هذا ما يجعل "الحياد" ليس إشكالية خاصة بلبنان وسوريا فحسب بل مسألة المشرق الواقع ضحية "فراغ القوة"، ويجعله خياراً أمام قواه المذهبية ونخبه الحاكمة المتصارعة، ومرتبطاً بفوائد التعاون المشترك بين بلدانه ومكوناته. هذا إن إرادت هذه المكونات أن يبقى لها مكان لها تحت الشمس وفي معادلة المنطقة من دون الحروب باسم الله والأولياء!

·        كاتب سياسي

بين إرضاء السعودية.. والتملق لإسرائيل.. والانتقام من الأميركيين

بين إرضاء السعودية.. والتملق لإسرائيل.. والانتقام من الأميركيين فرنسا تعيد المفاوضات النووية إلى «الطريق المسدود»

كيري (يسار) خلال لقائه ظريف (يمين) وفي الوسط آشتون خلال المحادثات في جنيف أمس الأول (رويترز) محمد بلوط خرج أحد مساعدي وزير الخارجية الفرنسي لوران فابيوس للقاء الصحافيين في إحدى قاعات «فندق إنتركونتيننتال» في مدينة جنيف السويسرية. الديبلوماسي الفرنسي زف الخبر إلى مجموعة من الصحافيين الفرنسيين مهللاً «لقد أعدنا المفاوضات بين الستة (5+1) وبين إيران إلى الطريق المسدود». الاستنتاج، بعد ذلك، أن فرنسا أفشلت اجتماع جنيف ومنعت انجاز تسوية تاريخية بين الغربيين وإيران حول ملف يكبل الإيرانيين بالعقوبات منذ أعوام جائز وليس اتهاما من دون سند. إنها بداهة تفرض نفسها في استنتاجات ومواقف الأميركيين والأوروبيين الآخرين. كما تفرض نفسها في مراقبة تحركات الديبلوماسية الفرنسية في كواليس المؤتمر، الذي كان يتجه إلى الخروج باتفاق تاريخي، قبل أن يصل فابيوس إلى قاعة الاجتماعات، ويخرج منها قبل الجميع ليعلن بنفسه فشل المؤتمر. كان ينبغي الاستماع إلى ديبلوماسي أميركي ليتبين اتساع الإجماع حول مسؤولية الديبلوماسية الفرنسية في إحباط تسوية كانت في متناول اليد والشعور بالمرارة. وقال «لقد عملنا معاً، أميركيون وأوروبيون وإيرانيون طيلة أشهر لإنجاح هذه العملية، وبالنسبة إلى فابيوس لم يكن الأمر إلا محاولة للظهور وإحاطة نفسه بالأهمية». عمل فابيوس على إحباط أي محاولة للتقدم. فبعد اجتماع مطول بين وزير الخارجية الأميركي جون كيري ونظيره الإيراني محمد جواد ظريف ووزيرة خارجية الاتحاد الأوروبي كاترين آشتون سارت فيه المباحثات على ما يرام، طلب الوزير الفرنسي الانضمام إلى الاجتماع، وبينما كان المتحدث باسم آشتون مايكل مان يعد لمؤتمر صحافي عند السادسة مساء، خرج وزير الخارجية الفرنسي من الاجتماع الثلاثي ليعلن فشل المحادثات دون أن يكون مكلفا بذلك، قائلا إن «الطريق لا تزال طويلة للتوصل إلى اتفاق». واضطرت آشتون وكيري إلى عقد مؤتمر صحافي، غير مقرر، في ساعة متأخرة من الليل لتصحيح الانطباع الذي خلفه الموقف الفرنسي مع تجنب الانتقادات العلنية. ولم يكن كيري مقنعاً في دفاعه عن موقف زميله الفرنسي، حيث قال «نعمل سوية مع الفرنسيين ونحن نتفق معهم على ضرورة العمل حول بعض القضايا» مع التأكيد أن الاتفاق لا يزال ممكناً. قبل بدء المؤتمر، طوّر الفرنسيون إستراتيجية إعلامية وتفاوضية بهدف عرقلة الاتفاق. لم يتوقف وزير الخارجية حتى قبل الوصول إلى قاعة المفاوضات في جنيف عن إبداء التشاؤم في احتمالات التوصل إلى اتفاق والقول إن «الطريق إليه لا تزال طويلة»، فيما كان وزير الخارجية البريطاني وليم هيغ ونظيره الألماني غيدو فيسترفيله يتحدثان عن اتفاق وشيك. قدّم الغربيون، قبل وصول الفرنسيين، تصوراً يعتمد على تقسيم المفاوضات مع إيران إلى مرحلتين، أو ما أسماه وزير الخارجية الأميركي جون كيري بالسلسلة التوفيقية: يرفع الغربيون العقوبات عن الذهب والمعادن الثمينة وعن 50 مليار دولار من الأرصدة الإيرانية المجمدة، في مقابل تقديم إيران خلال ستة أشهر ضمانات حول سلمية برنامجها النووي. وتم تداول أفكار كتجميد تخصيب اليورانيوم بنسبة 20 في المئة، أو وقف العمل بجزء كبير من 19 ألف جهاز لتخصيب اليورانيوم تملكها إيران قبل الانتقال إلى البحث في مرحلة ثانية من التسوية بأجزاء أخرى من البرنامج النووي الإيراني. في المقابل، طالب الإيرانيون بأن تتضمن المرحلة الأولى فكاً فوريا للحصار عن صادراتهم النفطية ورفع العقوبات عن القطاع المصرفي. أعاد الفرنسيون البحث في جنيف إلى النقطة الصفر. هم اعتمدوا إستراتيجية المطالبة بصفقة متكاملة تنفذ دفعة واحدة، فيما يعرفون مسبقا أنه يصعب تنفيذها إيرانياً. رفع الفرنسيون سقف مطالبهم للموافقة على المفاوضات ونص الاتفاق الذي قطع المفاوضون شوطاً كبيرا في تحريره، بحسب وزير الخارجية البريطاني، الذي قال إن «هناك اتفاقاً جاهزاً على الطاولة، لقد خضنا نقاشات جدية، وأقمنا علاقات رسمية وشخصية مع الوزير محمد جواد ظريف، وهو مفاوض صعب، ولكن بناء». وطرح فابيوس ثلاثة مطالب لتكبيل البرنامج النووي الإيراني دفعة واحدة: 1 ـ إغلاق مفاعل «آراك» الذي يعمل بالماء الثقيل، والذي يمكن لإيران من خلاله إنتاج البلوتونيوم الضروري لتصنيع القنبلة. 2 ـ البحث بمخزون إيران من اليورانيوم المخصب بنسبة 20 في المئة. تملك إيران منه 186 كليوغراما. وكانت هذه المسألة محور مفاوضات ماضية لم تصل إلى نهايتها لسحب المخزون الإيراني إلى دولة ثالثة وتحييده. 3 ـ البحث بالقضايا الجوهرية المتصلة بمعاهدة منع الانتشار النووي وفي حق إيران أو عدمه بالتخصيب. وهي قضية في صلب التسوية التي ستعرضها أميركا على إيران بقبول حد منخفض من التخصيب يضمن مدنية البرنامج الإيراني تحت رقابة وكالة الطاقة النووية، والخروج بتسوية مشرفة للطرفين. ومن الواضح إن إعادة طرح هذه المسألة في هذه المرحلة تستهدف ابتزاز الأميركيين والإيرانيين معا ومنع أي تسوية. لماذا يعرقل الفرنسيون التسوية الأميركية الإيرانية حول الملف الإيراني؟ لا يبدو التوقيت لإنجاز أي مرحلة من التسوية في الملف النووي الإيراني مطابقا لأولويات الديبلوماسية الفرنسية. فالإعلان عن تسوية تشارك فيها فرنسا في هذا الوقت لن يساعد الرئيس فرنسوا هولاند، الذي سيزور إسرائيل الأسبوع المقبل، على مصافحة رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو بالحرارة نفسها لو قام بتسهيل الاتفاق. وابعد من تزامن المفاوضات مع زيارة هولاند إلى إسرائيل واستعراض القوة الناجح للتيار المؤيد لإسرائيل في «الحزب الاشتراكي» الحاكم، فهناك الرغبة التي تعتمل لدى الخارجية الفرنسية للانتقام من الأميركيين الذين أهانوا الديبلوماسية الفرنسية في أكثر من ملف مشترك: من التخلي عن الضربة ضد سوريا من دون إعلام فرنسا التي تطوعت للمشاركة فيها والاتفاق الروسي الأميركي، الذي استبعد فرنسا من أي دور في التسوية حول سوريا، إذ غاب لوران فابيوس عن كل الاجتماعات التحضيرية التي أدارها وزير الخارجية الروسي سيرغي لافروف وكيري. وهناك أيضاً الرغبة بإرضاء الحليف السعودي. فالمنعطف الجديد للديبلوماسية الفرنسية ادخلها محوراً يشمل إسرائيل والسعودية معاً. وقال فابيوس إن التسوية «ينبغي أن تضمن أمن إسرائيل والمنطقة». فبعدما كانت قطر تشكل محور الديبلوماسية الفرنسية ونقطة ارتكازها في مقاربة سياستها العربية خلال حكم الرئيس الأسبق نيكولا ساركوزي، من دارفور فالساحل الإفريقي فليبيا وصولاً إلى لبنان وسوريا وإيران طبعاً، استبدلت ديبلوماسية فرنسوا هولاند القطريين بالسعوديين. وتعمل الديبلوماسية الفرنسية في سياسة عربية وإيرانية فضيلتها الكبرى أنها لم تعد تتعارض مع علاقاتها مع إسرائيل ولا مع مصالحها التي أصبحت مشتركة، وذلك بفضل التقارب حول سوريا والخوف من النووي الإيراني في الرياض وتل أبيب. ومن الواضح أن محور باريس ــ الرياض ــ تل أبيب يعمل ربما من غير تنسيق لكنه يسير في الاتجاه نفسه: ضد سوريا وإيران و«حزب الله». فبالتنسيق مع مدير الاستخبارات السعودية بندر بن سلطان ووزير الخارجية سعود الفيصل وبطلب إسرائيلي، قادت باريس مع لندن حملة في الإتحاد الأوروبي ضد الجناح العسكري لـ«حزب الله» انتهت بوضعه على لائحة «الإرهاب» وسمحت للرياض بطلب مماثل في مجلس التعاون الخليجي. ويقوم تنسيق فرنسي ــ سعودي واسع في مقاربة الملف السوري وفي دعم المعارضة المسلحة ورعاية «الائتلاف السوري» وفرض دفتر شروط سعودي بالفرنسية على أي مفاوضات في جنيف. لماذا يتجه الفرنسيون نحو الرياض؟ يعتقد الفرنسيون أنهم سيملأون الفراغ الذي سيخلفه الانسحاب الأميركي من الخليج ويطمحون إلى المزيد من التقارب مع الرياض التي تظهر ضيقا من التقارب الأميركي ــ الإيراني وتتقاسم هواجسها. والأهم يبرز في المرونة البريطانية والأميركية والألمانية، التي تطمح إلى التعجيل بالتسوية مع إيران، إذ بعد ثلاثة عقود من الانسحاب الأميركي من إيران والعقوبات، تتأهب الشركات الأميركية والألمانية والبريطانية لاستعادة سوق تعد بأكثر من ستين مليار دولار لتأهيل البنى التحتية والمنشآت النفطية وصناعة الغاز والنقل، فيما ليس مؤكدا أن يكون الفرنسيون في عداد العائدين بعد خروجهم تدريجيا منذ العام 2008 من إيران. ويطمع الفرنسيون، كعادتهم، في تحالفهم مع الرياض بعقد المزيد من الصفقات في الدفاع والبنى التحتية والنقل ومفاعل نووي تقدر كلها بثلاثين مليار دولار. وتزامن التفاوض حول إيران مع دخول الرياض وباريس مرحلة حرجة في المفاوضات حول بعض الصفقات، التي حاول هولاند إنهاءها وإنما أخرتها حالة الملك السعودي عبد الله بن عبد العزيز. ففي شهر تشرين الأول الماضي وقع السعوديون بعد طول انتظار عقدا مع الفرنسيين لتأهيل أربع فرقاطات بقيمة مليار ومئة مليون يورو. وينتظر الفرنسيون توقيعاً سعودياً على عقد بقيمة مليارين ونصف مليار دولار يشمل صواريخ من الجيل الجديد من طراز «كروتال»، تستحق كلها إرضاء الرياض وتأخير التسوية مع إيران.