Saturday, January 17, 2015

Why are French Jews returning to Israel in such numbers?

theguardian.com has a new look coming soon

Why are French Jews returning to Israel in such numbers?

A rise in antisemitism has undoubtedly played a part, but many are leaving for other reasons, such as the moribund economy
Binyamin Netanyahu speech synagogue
Binyamin Netanyahu giving a speech in honour of the victims of the terror attacks at the Grand Synagogue in Paris. Photograph: Matthieu Alexandre/AP
At the Jerusalem funeral of the four French Jews murdered in the HyperCacher supermarket, Claude Bloch was standing near the back listening to the French ecology minister, Ségolène Royal, deliver her eulogy on behalf of the French government.
A businessman, Bloch emigrated from France to Israel a quarter of a century ago but maintains strong links with his native country. He came, he explained, out of a sense of both solidarity and concern. “I go to France often and I’m worried,” he said, citing what he says is the unchecked rise of antisemitism in France, and Paris’s support for the recent Palestinian statehood bid at the UN security council.
“It is very complicated for Jews in France at the moment. There’s no protection. Jews are leaving France because of the French government’s ambiguous position towards them.”
Last year, according to figures from the Jewish Agency, a record number of French Jews emigrated to Israel – 6,600, from a total population of half a million in France, more than double the previous year’s total.
This year, according to some estimates, that number could reach 10,000. Daniel Benhaim, the Jewish Agency’s director, said that since the attacks in Paris, many more Jews were making inquiries than usual. “Normally in a week we receive 150 inquiries,” he said. “Now we’re getting 2,000.”
It is an issue that has been given added impetus in the immediate aftermath of the HyperCacher killings, as senior Israeli politicians have told French Jews they would be welcomed in Israel with open arms.
That message, delivered most prominently by the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and echoed by foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman and former finance minister Yair Lapid, has been criticised by some in Israel, who argue that such moves threaten to weaken the Jewish community in France, Europe’s largest.
Some leaders of the French Jewish community who met Netanyahu at a closed-door meeting in a Paris hotel last week are reported to have gone further. In anonymous remarks reported by the Times of Israel,one attendee described Netanyahu’s call on Jews to relocate as “extremely smug” and “patronising”.
Despite the framing of the exodus as a response to fear and antisemitism, many in Israel, including some recent immigrants from France interviewed by the Guardian, believe the reality is more complicated.
Funeral Philippe Braham Jerusalem
The funeral of Philippe Braham, one of the victims of the terrorist attack on a kosher grocery store, in Jerusalem. Photograph: Imago / Barcroft Media
Experts point out that there have been periodic peaks in immigration from France to Israel before: in 1948, after the foundation of the state of Israel; in 1967, following the six-day war; and during the second intifada, when some French Jews reported an upsurge in hostility in France.
Some experts say the recent surge of French Jews arriving in Israel has been driven, in addition to concern over antisemitism, by other motives, not least France’s moribund economy, which saw 250,000 French citizens of all backgrounds leave France last year.
Dov Maimon of the Jewish People Policy Institute, which is helping the Israeli government draw up its plan in the event of a sizeable influx of French Jews, is careful how he categorises the threat of antisemitism in France. “If you strip out antisemitism on the far right and far left and among French Muslims, only about 20% of French society would subscribe to antisemitic ideas. There is no state antisemitism. But there have been 8,000 antisemitic incidents recorded in France since 2000. You can see there is a danger.
“For French Jews of north African descent – with their history and recent past – it’s hard for them not to say that we’ve seen this movie before.”
His own maximalist projection – that a third of French Jews could ultimately leave France in the medium term – is based in part on the bleakest assessment of France’s economic, political and social trajectory in the coming years compared with that of Israel. He bases that number on the percentage of French Jews who are most observant and most identifiably Jewish in their dress and habits. Not everyone, however, agrees that a migration on such a scale is inevitable.
“The immigration for French Jews had been growing even before this attack,” says Esther Schely-Newman, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who is studying French Jewish immigration to Israel. “I would say the issue of antisemitism as a motive for coming waxes and wanes. It is an important part of the decision-making, but you don’t makealiyah [literally, “ascension” – immigration to Israel] on the spot.
“It is not a new phenomenon, but you can expect an increase in numbers right now because the safety of Jews in France feels shattered for now.”
Interviews with recent arrivals, she says, tell a more complex story than a disillusionment with France, not least the substantial number whose parents or grandparents had themselves moved to France from north African Jewish communities, and who make up the majority of France’s Jewish community.
“Many French Jews who came from north Africa see Israel as the final place. They saw France as a place they were for a while before finally coming home. I don’t want to say they are not loyal French citizens, but there is a feeling being here that they are able to act and live like Jews, unlike in France, where they have rights as individuals but not as a group.”
Among those recently choosing to emigrate to Israel, two groups have dominated: young single people under 35 and pensioners over 66. Schely-Newman’s argument appears borne out in part by recent immigrants to Israel who spoke to the Guardian and echoed the comments of Israel’s president, Reuven Rivlin, speaking at last Tuesday’s funeral, when he said that the decision to come to Israel should be made out of desire – “not out of fear”.
Siege grocery store
An image from the siege at the kosher grocery store in Porte de Vincennes, eastern Paris, in which four French jews were killed. Photograph: Gabrielle Chatelain/AFP/Getty Images
Gary Soleiman, 24, moved to Israel from Paris six years ago. His family still lives in France and his mother shops at the HyperCacher supermarket that was attacked. While conceding that Jews have also been killed in attacks in Israel, he, like many, points out that what is different is the sense of solidarity in Israel.
“Making aliyah should not be because people want to leave France, but because they want to come to Israel. There has been an increase in antisemitic crimes in France,” he says. But he is concerned that the message of recent days should not be interpreted as “France is not a place for Jews”.
“I think the French government should increase security for Jews in France. What is necessary is that it is possible to live in France as a Jew, not be afraid to go in the street with a kippa [skullcap] on your head.”
In some respects, the debate among Israelis, not least French-speaking Israelis, is unsurprising, reflecting the long and sometimes heated historic conversation within Zionism about the relationship with the Jewish diaspora.
Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth last week, Yossi Shain, an academic who has written on diaspora politics, underlined another dilemma confronting some French Jews. “The more secular French Jews are caught in a big trap. Many of them still believe in the Republic’s universal values, including the secularism doctrine. They feel that France, rather than Israel, is their national home.”
For the wealthiest, a small minority, there is another option – the ability to keep a foot in both camps. These are members of a phenomenon known in Israel as the “Boeing aliyah” – with a family member able to maintain a job in France, either by commuting or remote working, who can keep homes and family in both countries.
Shain’s view was echoed by David Gombin, another mourner at the funeral – a young journalist who had come out of solidarity with a colleague whose father was killed in the attack. “It is a pity,” said Gombin, who moved to Israel from near Marseilles. “I don’t want to think about a France without Jews.
“When I speak to the rest of my family still in France, they don’t want to come. They don’t speak Hebrew and they have good jobs. And here,” he says, referring to the threat of violence in Israel that also claims Jewish lives, “the situation is not all rosy.”
Additional reporting by Anne Penketh

Thursday, January 15, 2015

البابا: حرية التعبير لا تعني اهانة معتقدات الآخرين

البابا: حرية التعبير لا تعني اهانة معتقدات الآخرين
المصدر: "ا ف ب"
15 كانون الثاني 2015
قال البابا فرنسيس الخميس قبل وصوله الى مانيلا ان حرية التعبير "حق اساسي" لكنها لا تجيز "اهانة معتقدات الاخرين"، مؤكدا ان "القتل باسم الله" "شذوذ".وقال البابا في تصريحات ادلى بها في الطائرة التي كانت تقله من كولومبو الى مانيلا "لا يمكن استفزاز او اهانة معتقدات الاخرين، او التهكم عليها".ورد البابا فرانسيس بذلك على اسئلة طرحت في مؤتمر صحافي حول حرية تعبير رسامي الكاريكاتور ضد الديانات بعد الاعتداء الجهادي الذي استهدف مجلة شارلي ايبدو الساخرة الفرنسية واوقع 12 قتيلا الاسبوع الماضي في باريس.وتنشر شارلي ايبدو رسوما كاريكاتورية شديدة السخرية حول الاسلام وكذلك المسيحية والبابا.وشدد البابا على ان "يملك كل فرد ليس فقط الحرية والحق بل ايضا الواجب في التعبير عن افكاره للمساعدة على الصالح العام، واستخدام هذه الحرية امر مشروع لكن دون اهانة"، داعيا الى قول الحقيقة لا سيما في السياسة.وقال "اذا ادلى صديق باقوال مسيئة حول والدتي فقد يتوقع تعرضه للكمة، هذا طبيعي. لا يمكن الاستفزاز واهانة معتقدات الاخرين، لا يمكن السخرية منها".واضاف البابا باللغة الايطالية "هناك عدد كبير من الناس الذين يتحدثون خطا عن الديانات الاخرى ويسخرون منها ويتلاعبون بدين الاخرين، انهم استفزازيون".وشدد البابا على ان حرية الديانة وحرية التعبير "حقان من حقوق الانسان الاساسية".كما دان الجرائم المرتكبة باسم الدين فقال " لا يمكن الاهانة والقتل باسم الدين، وباسم الله" مؤكدا ان القتل باسم الله "شذوذ" "وينبغي الايمان بحرية، من دون اهانة وفرض قسري ولا قتل".وتابع البابا ان "ما يجري حاليا (الهجمات الجهادية) يثير استغرابنا، فلنفكر في كنيستنا: كم من حروب دينية شهدناها، فلنتذكر ليلة عيد القديس برثلماوس (المجزرة التي ارتكبها الكاثوليك بحق البروتستانت الفرنسيين وكانت في القرن السادس عشر بداية حروب دينية) لقد كنا نحن ايضا آثمين".

Monday, January 12, 2015

Mourning Charlie Hebdo Journalists, While Ignoring that US-NATO State-Sponsored Terrorism is the “Number One Killer” of Journalists


Subject: The "Number One Killer" of Journalists is US-NATO State-Sponsored Terrorism
To: antoinechaidar@gmail.com


Mourning Charlie Hebdo Journalists, While Ignoring that US-NATO State-Sponsored Terrorism is the “Number One Killer” of Journalists

Global Research, January 10, 2015

In the wake of the terrorist attack by self-proclaimed Al-Qaeda operatives killing 12 people including 8 journalists from the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the Western elite and mainstream media display of compassion and indignation highlights their complaisance towards Western and Israeli state terrorism.
Before exploring the broader issue, it should be noted that while the Paris attacks bear the hallmarks of a possible false flag, such as the ID card left in the car by one terrorist, an examination of the false flag hypothesis is excluded outright, completely ignored by the mainstream media. Moreover, one of the alleged terrorists, Cherif Kouachi told a French news outlet he had been financed by former Al Qaeda leader Anwar Al Awlaki, an American cleric who dined at the Pentagon a few months after 9/11 and «worked as a triple agent and an FBI asset well before 9/11», according to U.S. Lt.Col. Anthony Shaffer. (Kurt Nimmo, FBI Admits Pentagon Dinner Guest Al-Awlaki Worked for Them, Infowars, August 2, 2012)
Since the deadly attacks on January 7, 2015, the Western media, especially the French Canadian media, claim in a very ethnocentric manner that “the planet is mourning” the death of the French journalists. This tragic event which needs to be condemned must be examined in an appropriate context. People in countries where France has been bombing civilians, through NATO and U.S.-led military invasions, and where Western-backed terrorists kill innocent civilians (Libya, Syria) are routinely mourning the death of their own people. These deaths remain unreported. The Western world is not “the planet” and not “everyone is Charlie”, contrary to what the media leads us to believe.
Several newsrooms of the French Canadian public network Radio-Canada took pictures holding signs saying “I am Charlie”.
During the latest assault on Gaza, 13 Palestinian journalists were killed by the Israeli army. These journalists were killed to suppress the truth pertaining to Israeli atrocities. Western journalists holding signs of solidarity were nowhere to be found.
Before the James Foley and Steven Sotloff beheadings dozens of journalists were killed in Syria by terrorists armed, trained and financed by NATO countries and their antidemocratic allies such as Saudi Arabia. Hundreds of civilians had also been beheaded long before them, around 200 in one single village, according to a Human Rights Watch report. (See Julie Lévesque, The History of ISIS Beheadings: Part of the “Training Manual” of US Sponsored Syria “Pro-Democracy” Terrorists, Global Research, September 19, 2014)
The outrage and indignation, however, was reserved for the Western beheaded journalists. The war in Syria has been deadly for journalists, with 153 killed according to some estimates, thanks to NATO-sponsored terrorism. No Western journalist holding signs of compassion for Syrian journalists has been seen.
But the deadliest country in the world for journalists has been Iraq during the US occupation. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ):
The U.S.-led war in Iraq claimed the lives of a record number of journalists and challenged some commonly held perceptions about the risks of covering conflict. Far more journalists, for example, were murdered in targeted killings in Iraq than died in combat-related circumstances…
At least 150 journalists and 54 media support workers were killed in Iraq from the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 to the declared end of the war in December 2011, according to CPJ research.
Fatalities in Iraq far surpass any other documented war-time death toll for the press. CPJ, founded in 1981, recorded the deaths of 58 journalists during the Algerian civil war from 1993 through 1996, another 54 fatalities in the undeclared civil conflict in Colombia, which began in 1986; and 36 deaths in the conflict in the Balkans from 1991 to 1995….
Insurgent forces of one kind or another were responsible for the deaths of 110 journalists and 47 media workers. The actions of U.S. forces, including checkpoint shootings and airstrikes, were responsible for the deaths of 16 journalists and six media workers. (Frank Smyth, Iraq war and news media: A look inside the death toll, Committee to Protect Journalists, March 18 2013)
The BRussells tribunal numbers for Iraq are much higher:
In Iraq, at least 404 media professionals have been killed since the US invasion in 2003, among them 374 Iraqis, according to The BRussells Tribunal statistics. The impunity in Iraq is far worse than anywhere else in the world. (Dirk Adriaensens, The Killing of Journalists in Iraq, January 4, 2014)
Among the dead, two journalists – one Iraqi, Yasser Salihee, and one American, Steven Vincent – who had been investigating the US-backed death squads in Iraq.
On June 24, Yasser Salihee, an Iraqi special correspondent for the news agency Knight Ridder, was killed by a single bullet to the head as he approached a checkpoint that had been thrown up near his home in western Baghdad by US and Iraqi troops. It is believed that the shot was fired by an American sniper. According to eyewitnesses, no warning shots were fired.
The US military has announced it is conducting an investigation into Salihee’s killing. Knight Ridder has already declared, however, that “there’s no reason to think that the shooting had anything to do with his reporting work”. In fact, his last assignment gives reason to suspect that it was.
Over the past month, Salihee had been gathering evidence that US-backed Iraqi forces have been carrying out extra-judicial killings of alleged members and supporters of the anti-occupation resistance. His investigation followed a feature in the New York Times magazine in May, detailing how the US military had modeled the Iraqi interior ministry police commandos, known as the Wolf Brigade, on the death squads unleashed in the 1980s to crush the left-wing insurgency in El Salvador. (James Cogan,Journalist killed after investigating US-backed death squads in Iraq, World Socialist Web Site, July 1, 2005 )
American journalist Steven Vincent was kidnapped and murdered August 2 in Basra, the southern Iraqi city where he had been working as a freelance writer and blogger. Suspicion for this killing, the first of an American reporter in Iraq, focuses not on Al Qaeda or Sunni-based insurgents, but on the police of the Shiite-based administration installed in Basra with the support of US and British occupation forces.(Patrick Martin, US journalist who exposed Shiite death squads murdered in Basra, August 5, 2005)
For unknown reasons the Iraqi journalist Dr Yasser Salihee, was not included in the CPJ list.
The BRussels Tribunal further reports that numerous deaths go unreported by CPJ and Reporters without Borders. The explanation reflects the opposite of what is happening with the biased and emotional coverage of the Charlie Hebdo murders, namely downplaying the Iraqi journalists deaths.
It is a well-established fact that since the invasion of 2003 the corporate media have consistently downplayed mortality figures. The killing of media professionals is no exception. It’s obvious that the journalist advocacy groups in the West are reluctant to give the real casualty figures of their colleagues who lost their lives under the ruthless occupation of the US/UK, an occupation that is still ongoing. So they narrow their criteria of who should be included in their lists. This is an objectionable attitude, especially because it concerns professional colleagues….
Iraq was the deadliest country for media professionals in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013 (Adriaensens, op. cit.)
Almost 400 dead Iraqi journalists and yet our compassionate media professionals never held signs of solidarity.
Copyright © 2015 Global Research

Saudi Succession

The True Nature of the Saudi Succession "Crisis"

  • Abdullah of Saudi Arabia photo courtesy of wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_of_Saudi_Arabia
    JAN 9, 2015

    Every time a Saudi king gets seriously ill or dies, this triggers yet another media frenzy over a Saudi succession crisis. There is yet another round of speculation about major conflicts within the royal family, the destabilization of Saudi Arabia, and how the various tensions within the Kingdom could somehow trigger a civil crisis or conflict. King Abdullah’s illness is no exception. Anyone who has written on Saudi Arabia already has a flood of calls about what will happen if he dies, whether Saudi Arabia will have a massive political crisis, the royal family will self-destruct, or it will somehow be taken over by jihadist extremists.
    Some of this concern is natural. King Abdullah has been an exceptional ruler, and one who has led Saudi Arabia through a remarkably turbulent period in the Middle East. He first began to serve as de facto ruler when King Fahd had a stroke in 1995, and has been King since August 2005 – a period of nearly two decades. Throughout that period, a man who was sometimes reported to be anti-American and ultra-conservative before he took power has been a strong ally and a major reformer.
    Progress Under King Abdullah
    Outsiders can argue the pace of these reforms, but King Abdullah has presided over the steady modernization and liberalization of the Saudi economy. Education is still scarcely modern, but Saudi Arabia now has modern private universities, a steadily growing number of young Saudis studying in the United States, and more women graduate from secondary school and universities than men. 
    King Abdullah has sharply reduced corruption and limited the privileges of members of the royal family. Saudi budgets and five-year plans have steadily budgeted for the diversification of the economy, better infrastructure, health and education. Unlike most of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia also made major new investments in areas like education, job creation for Saudi youth, improved housing, and the other critical economic and social needs that create so much instability in the Arab world after 2011.
    The Saudi government and its security services have been steadily modernized, preserving close ties to the United States at every level. Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism activities have become steadily more effective, and have worked as close partners to those of the United States ever since Saudi Arabia was first challenged by Al Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula in 2003. U.S. and Saudi tensions have focused on how best to deal with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Islamic extremism; not on the need to cooperate or address the problems involved. 
    The Saudi government has quietly controlled the more extreme elements of the Saudi clergy, limited the role of the religious police, and moved toward evolutionary reform – an evolution that reflects the fact that the Saudi royal family is not a group of conservatives suppressing a more liberal population, but part of an elite that includes technocrats and business leaders and that has steadily modernized a conservative population ever since the days of Ibn Saud.
    Under King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has modernized key aspects of the Saudi justice system. It built up the role of legislative bodies like its Consultative Council or Majlis as-Shura, and even experimented with elections in 2005 and 2011 – with King Abdullah granting women the right to vote and stand for office in the municipal elections due this year – although the result of the past two elections was so tribal and conservative that it produced considerable caution about the pace of further reform.
    It is also important to note from a selfish outside view, that the Kingdom’s role in leading the other Southern Arab states in the Gulf Cooperation Council, in working with Jordan and Morocco, in providing aid to Egypt and other Arab states, and advocating the Arab peace plan has played a key global strategic role in ensuring the stable flow of petroleum exports to the world economy ever since the late 1970s, during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988, and during the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait in 1990-1991. Saudi Arabia has been critical to preserving some degree of regional stability in the face of a growing Iranian threat, during the rise of Islamic extremism that followed the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and during the new wave of upheavals that began in the spring of 2011. 

    Challenges Under and After King Abdullah

    This is scarcely to say that Saudi Arabia does not have problems, should not move faster in many areas, and does not need to carry out a continuing stream of social, political, and economic reforms. The role of women clearly must change so Saudi Arabia can use their talent and skills more productively. The Shi’ite minority needs more rights and equality. Education needs to modernize as fast as Saudi society will permit. The scope and power of legislative and elected bodies needs to increase.
    Saudi Arabia has faced, and will face, constant challenges in finding the pace of modernization and reform that pushes forward as fast as possible while retaining Saudi popular support, meeting Saudi Arabia’s unique religious and cultural needs, and ensuring that evolution will not turn into either regression or revolution. As events in other parts of the region since 2011 have shown all too clearly, it is easy to get things terribly wrong and very hard to keep them going right.
    Above all, the Saudi government needs to ensure that its rapidly growing population will have meaningful jobs and futures. It is almost impossible for outsiders to really understand the demographic dynamics involved, and estimates do differ sharply according to different sources. However, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the Saudi population grew from 3.86 million in 1950 to 7.2 million in 1975, 21.3 million in 2000, and 27.8 million in 2015, and will grow to 31.9 million in 2025, and 40.3 million in 2050 – in spite of the fact its annual population growth rate dropped from 2.9% in 1975 to 1.5% in 2015, and is projected to drop to 0.7% in 2050.
    For all of the Kingdom’s progress, it is also important to note that the CIA estimates that some 261,000 males, and a total of at least 506,000 men and women will reach job age in 2015 – and enter a market-driven labor force of 8.4 million, only about 1.7 million of which is now Saudi. This is an incredible challenge in terms of internal stability.
    While Saudi Arabia has largely met the challenge of dealing with this “youth bulge” under King Abdullah, it is important to note that its oil wealth was relative even in a period when petroleum prices were far higher than they are today. Again estimates differ, but the CIA and U.S. Energy Information Agency estimate that the Saudi per capita income was $31,300 in 2013, and the Saudi petroleum income per capita was $8,939.
    To put this in perspective, the United States has a per capita income of $52,800. A truly oil wealthy state like Qatar had a per capita income of $102,100 in 2013, and a petroleum income per capita of $40,943, although a seemingly wealthier UAE had a per capita income of  only $29,900 in 2013, and a petroleum income per capita of $9,736.
    Saudi Arabia must also use its limited funds to deal with far poorer and fractious neighbors whose problems pose a threat. Iran had a per capita income of $12,800 in 2013. Iraq had a per capita income of $7,100 in 2013, and a petroleum income per capita of $2,700. Yemen, whose oil income is negligible in per capita terms, had a total per capita income of only $2,500. There are many reasons why Saudi Arabia has some of the highest national security expenditures in the world. The Kingdom faces very real threats and has very real enemies – many of which are non-state actors that constantly threaten both terrorist violence and its legitimacy as custodian of Islam’s most important holy places.

    The “Threat” Posed by Succession 

    America and other outsiders do have reason to be concerned about the challenges and threats Saudi Arabia will face after King Abdullah. There are reasons for the close and enduring national security partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. But, and it is a criticalbut, it is far from clear that the focus on the succession should be anything like the focus of such concerns.
    First, it is important to ask what senior member of the royal family would slow King Abdullah’s pace of reform, weaken Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with the United States or other member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or make any other important and negative shift in Saudi Arabia’s polices? It is all very well to talk about royal power struggles, and royal politics are certainly very real – although one should remember that the United States has divisive politics of its own and faces the threat of a popular coup every four years. However, royal politics do not seem to have any key divisions over the most critical aspects of the Kingdom’s policies.
    The royal family’s dissenters are marginal at best, and more reform oriented – not ultraconservative. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has not faced a serious internal political battle since King Faisal rescued the government from an inept and wasteful King Saud during1962-1964 – in the middle of a crisis over the rising influence of Nasser. That was also a time when the formal structure of Saudi Arabia government was still relatively weak and primitive, its budget badly and arbitrarily managed, its security forces have uncertain loyalty, and its overall continuity of government was tenuous at best. None of these conditions exist today.
    Second, Saudi Arabia is scarcely an absolute monarchy. It does not wait for a succession for key members of its royal family, its senior ministers, and other leading policy voices to debate virtually every issue – with considerable help from its Majlis and media. It is not a democracy, but merit as much as birth is the key to influence. Moreover, virtually every key issue is debated internally and resolved with some degree of consensus. The choice of king really does matter, but so does the rest of Saudi Arabia’s senior leadership.
    Third, the Saudi government has a large and stable structure. There is no exact way to measure the number of key figures in the government, but there are some 33-35 critical ministries and other senior appointments. A total of eleven are held by members of the royal family, and eight by senior princes that are the grandsons, rather sons of Ibn Saud. Some 23 are technocrats. They will play a critical role in preserving the continuity of power during the succession, and most will remain in office regardless of how the succession progresses.
    Fourth, King Abdullah already prepared for his succession by reshuffling several key positions in his cabinet on December 7, 2014, including culture, telecommunications, transportation, agriculture and appointing younger ministers who could provide both continuity and a new level of energy and effort. He appointed a new Minister of Education, Prince Faisal bin Abdullah Muhammed Al-Saud to succeed H.E. Dr. Abdullah Ibn Saleh Bin-Obaid, and a woman, Noura Fayez to the new post of Deputy Minister of Women’s Education. He named Dr. Abdullah Al-Rabeeah as the new Minister of Health, and Mohammed ibn Abdul Kareem Al-Issa as the new Minister of Justice.
    He also appointed Muhammad Al-Jasser as Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Saudi Arabia’s central bank and a critical part of the government’s effort to manage and develop an economy. He replaced Islamic Affairs Minister Sheikh Saleh bin Abdulaziz al-Ashaikh – a descendent of Muhammad al-Wahab – with a new Minister that was not a member of the Al Shaikh family. All of these appointments seem to have been designed ensure that Saudi Arabia would increase the pace of modernization, not simply preserve continuity of his existing programs.
    It is in this context, that one should look at the actual line of succession. King Abdullah may well recover from his present illness. He is, however, over 90, and Saudi Arabia is reaching the point where the choice of the next king may be far less important than the one that brings the next generation of senior princes to the throne. The sons of Saudi Arabia’s modern founder – Ibn Saud – are all reaching an age where this change is becoming inevitable. King Abdullah has already outlived two Crown Princes, and the current Crown Prince, Salman bin abd al-Aziz Al Saud – who is also Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense—is at least 78 years old and is reported to be seriously ill.
    Reports do differ sharply over just how ill Prince Salman really is – and medical reports on the illnesses of the Saudi royal family can be grossly inaccurate. King Abdullah did, however, appoint Prince Muqrin bin Adb al-Aziz to the new post of Deputy Crown Prince in March 2014, and had appointed him as Deputy Prime Minister in February 2014. Prince Muqrin has been closely linked to Abdullah and his policies of modernization and reform, and is the youngest surviving son of Ibn Saud, having been born in 1945.
    King Abdullah also shook up several senior Saudi security appointments during 2014, and Prince Salman’s illness seems unlikely to affect Saudi security. Prince Saud al-Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud is foreign minister and has played a key role in shaping Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and partnership with the United States for decades. Prince Salman’s son, Mohammed bin Salman, is a Minister of State and chief of his father’s court, and is reported to play a role in defense policy and the Minister of Defense. King Abdullah’s son Prince Mitib bin Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud is now Minister of the National Guard,  Prince Muhammed bin Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud is Minister of the Interior, and Prince Khaled bin Bandar bin Abdalaziz Al Saud, the Head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Presidency. This is a strong and proven national security team, and one that has worked closely with the United States.
    It is unclear exactly how the succession will proceed. Some in the Kingdom question Murquin’s leadership role, and his birth. Salman might appoint another Crown Prince if he outlives Abdullah, and if he has the support of other senior members of the royal family. One possible candidate – and yet another member of the key Sudairi clan – Prince Ahmed bin Abd al-Aziz who was born in 1942, and a former Minister of the Interior. He also, however, was a prince that King Abdullah was reported to have fired in 2012, after serving only for a few months as Minister of the Interior and having been seen as an uncertain leader.
    At the same time, the Allegiance Council that King Abdullah created to establish a formal body to choose the succession could also play a role, particularly since one of its functions is to replace a king if he becomes ill and unable to perform his duties. Moreover, one needs to remember that regardless of the formal system, Gulf monarchies are reluctant to replace any living king and Abdullah served as de facto ruler for years during King Fahd’s illness and decline.
    The key fact, however, is that none of these uncertainties seem likely to present anything like the uncertainties that will come in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Like every nation in the world, the Kingdom faces major internal and outside challenges, has many areas where its future is unpredictable, and always has some form of disastrous worst case as a possible scenario. As succession crises go, however, the choice of next Saudi king is likely to be a non-crisis. The Kingdom has come a long way since the struggle that brought Ibn Saud to power. It is now a modern state by most standards, and its royal politics – while both interesting and uncertain – seem unlikely to be a serious source of instability or lead to serious shifts in its strategic role and partnership with the United States.
    Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Saturday, January 10, 2015

أسئلة "11 أيلول الفرنسي" ميشال أبو نجم النهار 10 كانون الثاني 2015

أسئلة "11 أيلول الفرنسي"
ميشال أبو نجم
النهار  10 كانون الثاني 2015

تتقاطع عند حدث "11 أيلول" الفرنسي جملة نقاط النقاش التي ترافق مسألة الإرهاب التكفيري والعلاقة بين الغرب والمجتمعات الإسلامية، وهي لا تختلف في العمق والمضمون عما طرحه تدمير برج التجارة العالمية من إشكاليات وردود فعل.
أولاً، تبقى المسألة الجوهرية في بيت قصيد إنتاج الظاهرة التكفيرية، الإصلاح الديني في الإسلام والقراءة العقلانية للنص المقدس الإسلامي. ترتفع الأصوات المطالبة بالمضي قدماً في هذه العملية الجريئة والخطيرة، ولو أنها تبقى نخبوية إلى حد كبير. تدرك نخب المجتمعات الإسلامية، فكرية ودينية وسياسية، أنها تحمل على أكتافها عبء حماية الإسلام نفسه مما يؤدي إليه التفسير الحرفي الغارق في الماضي من تشويه للدين الإسلامي وتقديمه على أنه يروّج للعنف والقتل والإرهاب.
لم يتغير شيء منذ أسئلة النهضة التي بدأت في مصر تحديداً ومنذ ذهب رفاعة الطهطاوي ومحمد عبده إلى عاصمة الأنوار في فرنسا وشقّا مع جمال الدين الأفغاني طريق الإصلاح الديني من أجل مستقبل حداثي عقلاني متنور تستحقه بلاد العرب والمسلمين، قبل أن يتوقف هذا المسار مع محمد رشيد رضا، وبعدما ألقت صدمة إلغاء الخلافة العثمانية الإسلامية الماء البارد على المجتمعات الإسلامية التي أنتجت حالة "الإخوان المسلمين" من أجل الحلم الكبير بإعادة الخلافة. ولم يزَل...
ثانياً، ستتوتر أكثر علاقة المجتمعات الغربية بالإسلام في شكلٍ مخاطرُه أنه قد يكون أكثر صدامية من العلاقة مع المجتمع الأميركي على أثر أحداث 11 أيلول. هنا، تاريخ طويل من المواجهات والإستعمار والتداخل بين أوروبا وشعوب المنطقة يلقي بثقله. والمهاجرون المسلمون في قلب مجتمعات أوروبا حيث مسألة الإندماج أكثر صعوبة من الحالة الأميركية لأن قدرة الإستيعاب أكبر في الولايات المتحدة التي نشأت أساساً كمجتمع من المهاجرين والهويات المختلفة.
ثالثاً، آفاق الإرتباط بين تداعيات هجمات الإرهاب التكفيري وسياق اللعبة الإستراتيجية الدولية والإقليمية، على إيقاع "المطحنة" البشرية في سوريا. ففيما ترتسم معالم خطوط تماس ونفوذ أكثر وضوحاً من جبال القلمون إلى حدود بغداد، تحت المراقبة الدقيقة لقوى التنافس الدولي، يبقى الصراع الإستراتيجي وسياسات الدول الكبرى هي الضابط والموجه في المرحلة المقبلة. وفيما أطلق 11 أيلول مساراً أسقط "طالبان" في أفغانستان لكنه امتد إلى الدول العربية تحت شعار "نشر الديموقراطية" والشرق الأوسط الجديد، تقف اليوم الولايات المتحدة والغرب أمام حريق لا يقتصر على العراق بل يلفح العالم العربي من المغرب إلى ليبيا، وسط قواعد لعبة مختلفة عن المرحلة السابقة.

صدام حضارات، في الشكل ممكن. في العمق هو صراع قوى دولية وإقليمية وتفاعلات داخلية، يتقاطع مع أزمة هوية إسلامية، ويُستغل فيه العامل الديني. إنه أكثر الجوانب خطورة الذي قد يؤدي إليه مسار المرحلة المقبلة عالمياً، والذي يشكل نموذج لبنان الرد الوحيد عليه. معنى لبنان الرسالة يتوضح أكثر فأكثر، فهو ليس شعاراً بل حقيقة في العيش الواحد بين مجموعات مختلفة تتمثل جميعها في النظام السياسي ضمن دولة محايدة إزاء الدين. والمسؤولية تقتضي مواجهة منطق "صدام الحضارات" بالقيم الإنسانية المشتركة المسيحية والإسلامية، معاً ضد الإرهاب وأي شكل من أشكال الكراهية.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

NEW GENERATION : ABSOLUTELY TRUE( The Millenial generation.)

 The Millenial generation.
NEW GENERATION : ABSOLUTELY TRUE( The Millenial generation.)

Daughter: "Dad, I'm in love with a boy who is far away from me. I am in Australia and he lives in the UK. We met on a dating website, became friends on Facebook, had long chats on Whatsapp, he proposed to me on Skype and now we've had two months of relationship through Viber.
Dad, I need your blessings and good wishes."
"Father": "Wow! Really!! Then get married on Twitter, have fun on Tango, buy your kids on Amazon and pay through Paypal.
And if you are fed up with your husband....sell him on Ebay.

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Graham Fuller’s Five Middle East Predictions for 2015


 
Graham Fuller is among the best analysts the CIA has ever produced.  He is now a well seasoned academic and scholar about Islam and the region.  I have read several of his books and articles.  Any US administration will be well served to follow his advice on the Middle East.  His predictions are worth considering.

January 3, 2015
by Graham E. Fuller • Blog • Tags: AfghanistanErdoganGraham FullerIranIraqISISRussiaSyriaTalibanTurkey •
Graham Fuller’s Five Middle East Predictions for 2015
Only a fool offers longer term predictions about the Middle East.
I offer the following longer terms predictions about the Middle East for 2015.
1-     ISIS will decline in power and influence. I have stated earlier that I do not believe ISIS is viable as a state; it lacks any coherent and functional ideology, any serious political and social institutions, any serious leadership process, any ability to handle the complex and detailed logistics of governance, and any opportunity of establishing state-to-state relations in the region. Additionally it has alienated a majority of Sunni Muslims in the world, regardless of deep dissatisfactions among Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. Ideally ISIS should fail and fall on its own, that is, without massive external, and especially Western, intervention that in some ways only strengthens its ideological claims. To be convincingly and decisively defeated, the idea of ISIS, as articulated and practiced, needs to demonstrably fail on its own and in the eyes of Muslims of the region.
2-     The role of Iran as an actor in the region will grow. Despite all the hurdles, I feel optimistic about US negotiations with Iran. Both parties desperately need success in this regard. Normalization is ludicrously long overdue and necessary to the regional order. Furthermore, Iran and Turkey, are the only two “real” governments in the region today with genuine governance based on some kind of popular legitimacy—for all their faults. Turkey is democratic, Iran semi-democratic (presidential elections, while not fully representative, really matter.) These two states espouse many of the aspirations of the people of the region in ways no Arab leader does. The Gulf will be forced to accommodate itself to the reality of a normalized Iran; the two sides have never really been to war, despite all the occasional bellicose noises that have emerge from them periodically over the past century. Iran is post-revolutionary power with a vision of a truly sovereign Middle East free of western domination– none of the Arab states truly are. Iran’s influence in the region will also grow in supporting growing regional challenges to Israel’s efforts to keep the Palestinians under permanent domination.
3-     President Erdoğan in Turkey will find his influence beginning to crumble in 2015. After a brilliant prime-ministership for the first decade of AKP power, he has become mired in corruption charges and has lashed out in paranoid fashion against any and all who criticize or oppose his increasingly irrational, high-handed, and quixotic style of rule. He is in the process of damaging institutions and destroying his and his party’s legacy. I continue to have faith that Turkey’s broader institutions, however weakened by Erdoğan, will nonetheless suffice to keep the country on a basically democratic and non-violent track until such time as Erdoğan loses public confidence—which could be sooner rather than later.
4-     Russia will play a major role in diplomatic arrangements in the Middle East, an overall positive factor. Russia’s ability to play a key diplomatic (and technical) role in resolving the nuclear issue in Iran, and its important voice and leverage in Syria represent significant contributions to resolution of these two high-priority, high-risk conflicts that affect the entire region. It is essential that Russia’s role be accepted and integrated rather than seen as a mere projection of some neo-Cold War global struggle—a confrontation in which the West bears at least as much responsibility as Moscow. The West has insisted on provoking counter-productive confrontation with Moscow in trying to shoehorn NATO into Ukraine. Can you imagine an American reaction to a security treaty between Mexico and China, that included stationing of Chinese weapons and troops on Mexican soil?
5-     The Taliban will make further advances towards gaining power within the Afghan government. After 13 years of war in Afghanistan the US failed to bring stability to the country as a whole, or to eliminate the Taliban as a major factor in the national power equation. The Taliban is much more than an Islamist movement; it has in many ways been a surrogate for nationalist Pashtun power within Afghanistan (although not accepted as such by all Pashtun). The Pashtun lost out big when the Taliban government was overthrown by the US in 2001; inclusion of mainstream Taliban within the new government is essential to future Afghan stability. The Taliban will seek to strengthen their power on the ground this year in order to enhance their powers of political demand in any possible future negotiations over power sharing. They cannot be functionally excluded. Desperately needed stability in Pakistan also depends in part upon such a settlement.